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UNION REPRESENTATION AT INVESTIGATORY
INTERVIEWS: THE SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENT
OF WEINGARTEN
I. INTRODUCTION
T HIS NOTE FOCUSES ON THE PROBLEMS engendered and unresolved by the
Supreme Court's 1975 decision in NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc.'
Weingarten held that section 7 of the Labor Management Relations Act
(L.M.R.A.) 2 creates a statutory right entitling an employee to union
representation at an investigatory interview which the employee reasonably
believes will result in disciplinary action. An employer's refusal to permit such
representation and insistence that employee attend the interview unaccom-
panied constitutes an unfair labor practice.3
The right to representation is subject to the satisfaction of four conditions:
(1) the employee must request representation at the interview (although the
employee may forego this right and attend the interview unaccompanied);4
(2) the employee must reasonably believe that the interview will result in
disciplinary action;5 (3) "the exercise of the right may not interfere with the
employer's legitimate prerogatives;"" and (4) since "the employer has no duty
to bargain with any union representative who may be permitted to attend the
investigatory interview," 7 the employer may insist that the interviewer is only
' 420 U.S. 251 (1975). Justice Brennan authored the majority opinion; Chief Justice Burger
filed a dissenting opinion; Justice Powell, joined by Justice Stewart, also wrote a dissenting
opinion.
This controversy began when a "Loss Prevention Specialist" hired by an employer was
interrogating an employee about an alleged theft from employer's store. During the course of the
interview the employee repeatedly requested a union representative, but such requests were
denied by the specialist. After the specialist verified the employee's explanation, the specialist
apologized for the inconvenience and said the matter was closed. The employee then became
hysterical and blurted out that the only thing she had ever gotten from the store without paying
was her free lunch. The store in question, unlike other of the employer's stores, did not have a free
lunch policy. The employee was then closely interrogated about violations of the store's policy as
to free lunches. The employee again requested the union steward be present, and again was
refused. The specialist, after making inquiries of other individuals, concluded the interview with
the employee. For a more detailed account of the facts, see Note, Employee Right to Union
Representation During Employer Negotiation, NLRB v. J. WEINGARTEN, INC., 420 U.S. 251
(1975), 7 U. TOL.L. REv. 298 (1975).
2 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976) states in pertinent part: "Employees shall have the right . . . to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection.
1 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976) states: "(a) Itshallbean unfair laborpractice foranemployer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in sec-
tion 157 of this title .. "
In a companion case, ILGWU v. Quality Mfg. Co., 420 U.S. 276 (1975), the Court held that an
employer also violates § 8(a)(1) by discharging or otherwise disciplining an employee who
refuses to participate in an investigatory interview without a union representative in attendance.
4 420 U.S. at 257.
5 Id. The reasonableness of the employee's belief is to be tested by an objective standard. See
notes 52-61 infra and accompanying text.
6 420 U.S. at 258. This restriction permits the employer to refuse to allow representation,
without justifying his refusal, and to proceed with an inquiry by other means after giving the
employee the option of attending the interview unaccompanied or foregoing the interview.
I Id. at 259.
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interested, at that time, "in hearing the employee's own account of the matter
under investigation. 8
Weingarten attempted to redress certain inequities inherent in the
employer-employee relationship. The Court perceived the nature of an
investigatory interview to be unreasonably coercive of an employee's right to
protect his job interests.9 Such an interview traditionally took place prior to
the imposition of discipline for an infraction,"0 and employees usually were
compelled to attend such interviews alone unless there was a provision in the
collective bargaining agreement according employees the right of union
representation at such interviews." The Weingarten Court's concern with
investigatory interviews focused on the stressful nature of the interview and
the possible impairment of an employee's ability to protect his interests,
particularly in view of the potentially serious consequences of the interview.' 2
Although the investigatory interview is closely linked to the grievance
procedure, 13 the Court rejected the argument that the grievance procedure
would serve as an adequate correction to employer abuses incurred during an
investigatory interview.1 4
8 Id. at 260.
1 Id. at 257.
10 Brodie, Union Representation and the Disciplinary Interview, 15 B.C. INnus. & COM. L.
REv. 1, 2 (1973).
" Arbitral awards, however, had sustained the right of representation at an investigatory
interview which the employee reasonably believed might result in disciplinary action, even
where such a right was not explicitly provided in the agreement. Allied Paper Co., 53 Lab. Arb. &
Disp. Settl. 227 (1969); The Arcods Co., 39 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 785 (1962); Valley Iron Works,
33 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 769 (1960); Schlitz Brewing Co., 33 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 57 (1959).
12 420 U.S. at 262.
13 An investigatory interview is a preliminary stage in the imposition of discipline. The
employer will call the employee to the interview to hear the employee's version of the
circumstances surrounding the employee's alleged misconduct. At the conclusion of the
interview, or shortly thereafter, the employer will make the decision about discipline and then
inform the employee. If discipline is imposed, the employee may then attempt to seek relief
through the grievance procedure.
The general definition of a grievance usually relates to some action already taken by the
employer. At the time of the investigatory interview the employer has only called the employee to
the interview and nothing has happened to give the employee cause to seek relief through the
grievance procedure. Technically the stages prior to any action adverse to the employee by the
employer should be termed pre-grievance. If the focus is on the employee and his interests, then
the grievance/pre-grievance distinction is less important. Brodie, supra note 10, at 3. The
relationship between investigatory interviews and the grievance procedure was assumed in
Comment, Union Presence in Disciplinary Meetings, 41 U. Cm. L. REv. 329 (1974), cited by the
Court in Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 253 n.3.
A more extreme position advocates not separating the preliminary investigation from
subsequent activities by analogizing the labor relations disciplinary system to the criminal law,
which does not distinguish preliminary investigations from subsequent activities. Silard, Rights of
the Accused Employee in Company Disciplinary Investigations, Pnoc. OF N.Y.U. On ANN. CONF.
ON LAB. 217 (1970).
14 In response to the proposition that the grievance procedure is an adequate corrective, the
Weingarten Court stated:
[The] respondent would defer representation until the filing of a formal grievance
challenging the employer's determination of guilt after the employee has been
discharged or otherwise disciplined. At that point, however, it becomes increasingly
difficult for the employee to vindicate himself, and the value of any representation is
correspondingly diminished. The employer may then be more concerned with
justifying his actions than re-examining them.
420 U.S. at 263-64 (footnotes omitted).
The reasoning of the Court lacks explanation as to how the Court arrived at the conclusions (1)
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The statutory right to representation is premised upon the theory of
constructive concerted activity.15 This theory is based upon the rationale that
a single employee, when pressing a complaint in reliance upon an agreement
made by and for the benefit of the entire bargaining unit, is acting, by
implication, for the other employees. 6 Likewise, when an employee defends
against a charge of misconduct, he is acting on behalf of other employees. 7
Using this reasoning, the Weingarten Court made union representation at
investigatory interviews a protected activity.
8
The right to representation is one of procedural due process, requiring that
the employee receive a fair hearing. Weingarten represented a major
breakthrough in the area of employee due process rights by establishing the
basic framework of the right to representation. However, many questions
remain unresolved as to exact parameters of this right. The undetermined
issues involved such matters as invocation of the right, waiver, duty of fair
representation, the scope of the employer's responsibility, the role of the
union, and extension of the right to employees not represented by a union.
Some of these questions have been dealt with by the National Labor Relations
Board (hereinafter the Board), the courts, and arbitrators. This article will
address itself to the interpretation and application of Weingarten in the
development of the right to representation.
II. INTERESTS AND ROLES OF THE PARTIES
The interests of the employer and the employee and union must be
considered in any subsequent expansion or constriction of the Weingarten
right to representation. The underlying interest of an employer is the
maintenance of efficiency and productivity, while the fundamental objectives
of the employee and union are job security and favorable working
conditions. 9 The Weingarten right interposes a barrier to the arbitrary and
that it is increasingly difficult for the employee to vindicate himself, and (2) that the employer is
more concerned with justifying his actions than re-examining them. These conclusions are
questionable in view of the fact that the grievance procedure has traditionally served as the
corrective mechanism to the disciplinary system.
's Bartosic, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term: The Allocation of Power in Deciding Labor Law
Policy, 62 VA. L. REv. 533, 574-77 (1976).
'" See Comment, Constructive Concerted Activity and Individual Rights: The Northern
Metal-Interboro Split, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 152 (1972). The leading case in the area is NLRB v.
Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967). For a summary of the development of
the constructive concerted activity doctrine, see Comment, supra note 13, at 336-40.
17
The constructive concerted activities cases resolve disputes in which the contract term is
at issue. Although many disciplinary cases hinge on the interpretation of a contract term,
some are purely factual disputes. Even if an employee contests only the factual
allegations, however, the resolution of the case may affect other employees.
Comment, supra note 13, at 338.
"s 420 U.S. at 261. The Court noted:
The quantum of proof that the employer considers sufficient to support disciplinary
action is of concern to the entire bargaining unit. A slow accretion of custom and
practice may come to control the handling of disciplinary disputes. If, for example, the
employer adopts a practice of considering [a] foreman's unsubstantiated statements
sufficient to support disciplinary action, employee protection against unwarranted
punishment is affected.
Id. at n.6.
1 Killingsworth, Management Rights Revisited in Arbitration and Social Change, Paoc. 22d
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capricious exercise of the discipline and discharge power by the employer.
When an employee is subjected to discipline or discharge, 2 the fate of that
employee is of concern to the other employees and the union. The action of an
employer in unfairly or arbitrarily imposing discipline upon one employee
represents a threat to the security of the other employees and to the position of
the union as an advocate of the employee's interests.
In order to protect against the unjust imposition of discipline, the majority
of collective bargaining agreements include a grievance procedure which
may culminate in arbitration.2 1 Sufficient investigation of a dispute is implicit
in grievance resolution. Failure by either the union or management to
adequately investigate the circumstances which provided the basis for the
imposition of discipline may result in that party losing the case at arbitration2
2
and incurring liability for a breach of the duty of fair representation.2 3
The initial investigation is often determinative of the later actions of the
employer and union. The need to utilize all steps of the grievance procedure
and arbitration 24 in order to achieve an equitable resolution of a discipline
grievance could be minimized by full and accurate investigation at the
inception of the dispute. This is usually the investigatory interview.2 5 At the
early stages of a dispute, the parties are not yet locked into any position and
are more receptive to considering additional facts and viewpoints. 26 A rule
which would encourage complete investigation during the earlier stages of
the dispute is not only desirable but also would reduce the burden on the
grievance-arbitration process .27
Union representation at the investigatory interview is intended to benefit
all the parties involved. 28 The individual employee, the subject of the
ANN. MEErING OF NAT'L ACAD. ARa. 1, 3-13, 19 (Somers ed. 1969), reprinted in R. SMrrH, L.
MERRIFI , & D. ROTHSCHILD, CoLLEcrivE BARGAINING AND LABOR ARBITRATION, 312-13 (5th ed.
1970) [hereinafter cited as R. SMrrH].
20 One commentator labelled discharge the capital punishment of labor relations. Brodie,
supra note 10, at 7.
21 R. SMrrH, supra note 19, at 104. It should be noted that the grievance procedure is not
limited to consideration of discipline complaints. See generally id.
22 Both parties to an arbitration run the risk of non-persuasion. A party to an arbitration must
offer sufficient material and evidentiary facts to support or justify its position. Without adequate
investigation it is difficult to supply the requisite material and evidentiary facts. Gorske, Burden of
Proof in Grievance Arbitration, 43 MARQ. L. REv. 135, 138 (1959).
"The failure of management of make a reasonable inquiry or investigation before assessing
punishment [is] a factor [and sometimes the sole factor,] in the arbitrator's refusal to sustain the
discharge or discipline as assessed by management." F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOuI, How ARBrrRATION
WoRS 632 (1973).
23 Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554 (1976). See also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171
(1967).
24 Inadequate investigation of grievances has been considered a factor in the overload of the
grievance and arbitration process. This overload is not only costly to the employer and union in
terms of time and money but also costly to the employee. The individual employee suffers a
detriment when the employer and union indulge in trading of grievances to lighten the grievance
workload. Comment, supra note 13, at 344 n.89.
25 Schulman, Reason, Contract and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HAnv. L. REv. 999,1017 (1955).
26 420 U.S. at 263-64.
27 One commentator observed: "[R]ules designed to encourage full consideration and effort at
adjustment in the prior stages of the grievance procedure may be quite desirable." Schulman,
supra note 25, at 1017.
28 420 U.S. at 260-63.
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interview, is interested in the protection of his job security as well as the
avoidance of unreasonable discipline.2 9 A union representative can aid the
individual employee by eliciting favorable facts and by serving as a witness to
the interview. Also, "[t]he union representative . . safeguard[s] the
interests of the entire bargaining unit by exercising vigilance to make certain
the employer does not initiate or continue a practice of imposing punishment
unjustly."30 The employer's interest in efficiency is enhanced by the elicitation
of facts by the union representative, thus saving time, and the representative
can sooner determine the merit of a grievance which would reduce the filing
of unsubstantial grievances. 31
There are four interests of varying importance to consider in determining
the employee's right to representation: (1) the employer's interest in retaining
a relatively unfettered right to direct the workforce; (2) the individual
employee's interest in his job security; (3) the collective interest in job
security; and (4) the union's interest in fairly representing all employees. At
times these interests conflict despite the effort in Weingarten to strike a
balance among them. The conflict surfaces particularly in the following areas:
coercion by the employer; the role of the representative; and waiver, either by
contract or refusal to participate, of the right to representation by the union.
Such conflict, within the framework of Weingarten, must be resolved by
balancing the values and policies articulated by each interest.
III. TiH PROGENY OF Weingarten
When a new principle of law is established, the scope of that principle
must be determined and the language creating it must be defined. The cases
which were decided after Weingarten have begun the process of clarifying
the right to representation.
A. The Elements of the Right to Representation
The definition of the components of the right to representation has
proceeded primarily in two areas: in determining what constitutes an
"investigatory interview" and what constitutes an employee's "reasonable
belief that discipline may result." Weingarten defined an "investigatory
interview" negatively. 32 Since the right to representation established by
Weingarten only arises when an interview is investigatory, the characteristics
of an investigatory interview must be reasonably ascertainable in a positive
sense.
1. Right to Representation at Investigatory Interviews
From Weingarten, it appears that for a meeting or discussion to be
29 Id. at 260.
30 Id. at 260-61 (footnote omitted).
31 Id. at 263. See also Caterpillar Tractor Co., 44 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 647, 651 (1965).
32 The Weingarten Court, quoting from Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 197 (1972), stated:
We would not apply the rule to such run-of-the-mill shop-floor conversations as, for
example, the giving of instructions or training or needed corrections of work techniques.
In such cases there cannot normally be any reasonable basis for an employee to fear that
any adverse impact may result from the interview, and thus . . .no reasonable basis
for him to seek the assistance of his representative.
420 U.S. at 257-58.
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characterized as an "investigatory interview" it must vary, in some manner,
from the normal, everyday subject matter and procedure of discussion
between the employer and employee.3 1 In defining investigatory interview,
the threshold question is whether the subject matter and purpose of the
discussion have a reasonable nexus to the disciplinary system.34 There are
three categories of meetings or discussions which relate to discipline in
varying degrees: instructional, investigatory, and disciplinary.
Weingarten explicitly excluded instructional interviews from the scope of
the representation rule. 35 While such an interview carries with it the threat that
discipline may follow if the employee cannot or will not comply with the
directive, such latent threat does not invoke the right to representation. 36 An
instructional interview about work techniques lacks a sufficient nexus with the
disciplinary systems since the immediate purpose of the interview is not "to
obtain facts to support disciplinary action that is probable or that is being
seriously considered. '"3
7
An ostensibly instructional interview may, however, give rise to the right
to representation if such interview is an integral part of the disciplinary
system. In Alfred M. Lewis, Inc .,38 the Board held that counselling sessions to
discuss production quotas were within the ambit of Weingarten.39 The
counselling sessions were mandatory for an employee who had failed to attain
the production quota. If the employee continued to not achieve the
production quota, he could be terminated. 40 The counselling sessions were
found to be an integral part of the progressive disciplinary process; the nexus
between the sessions and discipline caused these meetings to be categorized
as "investigatory interviews."
A meeting may qualify as an investigatory interview if it entails a
questioning, discussion, criticism, or inquiry about the employee's conduct so
that the employee is permitted to defend or explain his conduct prior to the
final decision to discipline the employee. The Weingarten Court perceived an
33 Id.
34 A prerequisite to the right to representation is that the employee must reasonably fear
discipline will result from the interview. For discipline to possibly result from an interview, the
subject of the interview must have a reasonable relation to discipline. Id. at 257.
35 Id. at 257-58.
36 Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1978). The Ninth Circuit upheld the
Board's order that an employer violated § 8 (a) (1) by refusing to permit union representatives to
be present at counselling sessions regarding employees' failure to meet the production quota. The
court agreed with the Board's findings that the counselling sessions were an integral part of the
disciplinary system and that the counselling sessions were investigatory in nature because the
employees were questioned about their work performance.
If, subsequent to the counselling sessions, an employee continued to fail to meet the
production quota, discipline would be imposed. The employer would then meet with the
employee to advise the employee of the disciplinary action and the reasons for it. The Ninth
Circuit refused enforcement of the Board's order which held these meetings to be within
Weingarten even though the meetings were "cut and dried." The court held that a meeting which
lacks an investigatory element and is merely explanatory does not give rise to a right to
representation.
37 Id. at 410; see AAA Equip. Serv. Co. v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 1142, 1146 (8th Cir. 1979).
38 587 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1978).
39 Id. at 410.
40 Alfred M. Lewis, Inc., 229 N.L.R.B., 757,757-58 & n.3 (1977), enforcement denied, 587 F.2d
403 (9th Cir. 1978).
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investigatory interview as a meeting which occurs prior to an employer's
assessment of the appropriate discipline, to ascertain whether there is a basis
for the imposition of discipline.4' This view is consistent with the function of
investigation in the grievance process42 and the definition of investigatory
interview applied by arbitrators .13
The distinction drawn between a disciplinary interview and an
investigatory interview depends upon whether the subject matter of the
interview is dispositive of the imposition of discipline or whether the subject
matter of the interview merely initiates the possibility of discipline being
imposed. Keystone Steel & Wire, 4 in which the employees were summoned
to the supervisor's office and handed an infraction notice, exemplifies a
disciplinary interview.
The distinction between disciplinary and investigatory interviews was
blurred by the Board in Certified Grocers of California,4 5 a case with facts
nearly identical to those in Keystone Steel & Wire. The Board, holding the
meeting in Certified Grocers to be an investigatory interview within the scope
of Weingarten, made the determination of whether an interview was
investigatory depend upon whether the employee reasonably feared adverse
consequences from the interview. If the employee reasonably believed
discipline would result from the interview, then the interview was
investigatory. The dissenting members of the Board noted that Weingarten
had established two separate requirements: the interview must be in-
vestigatory, and the employee must reasonably believe adverse conse-
quences will result from the investigatory interview. 46 The standard which the
dissent would have applied to determine if an interview was investigatory
41 See note 1 supra.
42 The investigatory process is used to establish the existence of cause for discipline. See
Brodie, supra note 10, at 1.
43 For the arbitral definition of investigatory interview, see Allied Paper Co., 53 Lab. Arb. &
Disp. Settl. 226 (1969) (interview to question employee and inform employee that conduct would
not be tolerated held to be investigatory as employee reasonably feared discipline); Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 44 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 647 (1965) (conversation where employer berated and
criticized employee so that employee reasonably feared discipline held to be an investigatory
interview); The Arcods Co., 39 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 784 (1962) (employee reasonably feared
discipline and interview entailed a discussion and questioning about misconduct of employee);
Valley Iron Works, 33 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 769 (1960) (representation at interview is
appropriate even though interview is prior to the filing of a grievance, if employee reasonably
fears discipline); Schlitz Brewing Co., 33 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 57 (1959) (grievance in the
formative stages when employee summoned for "corrective interview").
44 217 N.L.R.B. 995 (1975). Here, a company superintendent issued an infraction notice, to be
delivered to the employees by the supervisor. The supervisor handed each employee a notice
after a brief conversation with each of them. Held: the conversation "was more than investigatory
meeting;" it was a disciplinary meeting. Id. at 997.
45 227 N.L.R.B. 1211 (1977), enforcement denied, 587 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1978). In this case,
higher management issued a disciplinary notice. The employee's supervisor, at an office meeting,
informed the employee of his unsatisfactory work performance; he was then handed the
disciplinary notice.
41 As a dissenting Board member stated in Certified Grocers:
The [Weingarten] Court did not decide that an employee is entitled to have a union
representative present at any meeting to which he is called by his employer so long as he
reasonably believes that an interview resulting in disciplinary action against him may
occur. It is only a particular kind of interview-an investigatory interview-which gives
him this right.
227 N.L.R.B. at 1216 (Walther, dissenting) (emphasis added).
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depended upon whether "the meeting [was] .. . for the purpose of eliciting
facts or permitting the employee to explain and/or defend his con-
duct....- 4 7 The dissent's test would result in a decision more consistent with
Keystone Steel & Wire and the purposes of Weingarten. The situation in
Certified Grocers was "not an instance . .. in which a union steward could
aid in the developing of facts at an investigatory interview or help the
employee to articulate his position - rather, the investigation had occurred
prior to the meeting, and thus even before the meeting the [discipline] was a
fait accompli.."4
8
The Ninth Circuit, in refusing to enforce the Board's order, adopted the
dissent's position, holding that the interview was appropriately classified
disciplinary rather than investigatory, since the purpose of the interview was
to dispose of the matter by informing the employee of the discipline to be
imposed rather than to permit the employee to defend his actions. 49
A prerequisite for an interview or meeting to be classified as investigatory
is that the subject matter of the meeting have a reasonable nexus to the
disciplinary structure. Additionally, the dominant purpose of the interview
should be to determine if any basis exists for the imposition of discipline.50 If
an interview at which the employee is permitted to explain or defend his
conduct results in the imposition of discipline, the interview should be
considered investigatory. The interview is disciplinary if the decision to
discipline the employee occurs prior to the interview.51
2. The Employee's "Reasonable Belief"
Weingarten further required the employee to reasonably believe that the
interview would result in disciplinary action.5 2 The reasonableness of an
employee's belief was to be measured by objective standards under all
circumstances of the case; 53 the Weingarten Court rejected a rule which
would require a probe of an employee's subjective motivations. 54 Cir-
cumstances which would have a bearing on the resolution of the question of
reasonableness should include the following: (1) the employee's past
disciplinary record;55 (2) recent events in which the employee was involved
that might prompt a charge of misconduct; 56 (3) the proposed subject of the
47 Id.
48 Walther, Climax Molybdenum and Its Progeny-Whither Weingarten, 1977 LAB. REL. Y.B.
189, 194.
19 NLRB v. Certified Grocers of Cal., 587 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1979).
50 The "dominant purpose" requirement is necessary to distinguish between an interview
solely for the purpose of imposing discipline (a disciplinary interview), and an interview to
permit the employee to explain or defend his conduct, or to criticize the employee's work where
discipline is imposed or is a possibility at the conclusion of the interview.
51 Amoco Oil Co., 238 N.L.R.B. No. 84,99 L.R.R.M. 1250 (Sept. 27, 1978), where the Board
held that an employer did not violate the L.M.R.A. by denying an employee's request for
representation and then informing the employee of pre-determined discipline.
52 420 U.S. at 257.
53 Id. at 257 n.5.
54 Id.
5 Certified Grocers of Cal., 227 N.L.R.B. 1211 (1977), enforcement denied, 587 F.2d 449 (9th
Cir. 1978).
50 Climax Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB, 584 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1978); Detroit Edison Co. &
Local 233, 218 N.L.R.B. 61 (1975).
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interview, if known to the employee;57 (4) formality of the interview;- (5)
rank of the interviewer in employer's hierarchy; 59 (6) place and manner of
interview;60 and (7) the usual procedure for discussion between employer and
employee.61
Not all these factors need be present in any given situation, but merely a
sufficient number to ensure that the employee's belief was reasonable.
Reasonableness, of course, is a question of fact to be determined by the fact-
finder. The presence of some or all of these factors would serve to alert an
employer that union representation at the investigatory interview may be
required by Weingarten.
B. Employees - the Protected Group
1. Non-unionized Employees Have a Right to Representation
The emphasis of Weingarten is clearly directed at the protection of the
rights of employees. Throughout the decision, the Court repeatedly referred
to the right to representation as the right to union representation. The logical
question then is whether this right to representation extends to employees
who are not represented by a union. Dissenting in Weingarten, Justice Powell
observed that "[w]hile the Court speaks only of the right to insist on the
presence of a union representative, it must be assumed that the §7 right today
recognized, affording employees the right to act 'in concert' in employer
interviews, also exists in the absence of a recognized union."62 Concerted
action for mutual aid or protection by unorganized employees has been held
to be protected activity under section 7 of the L.M.R.A.6 As the right to
representation is derived from section 7, the extension of that right to non-
unionized employees would be generally consistent with prior case law.
The courts and the Board have quickly enlarged the right of representation
to include unorganized employees. In O.C. & Atomic Workers International
Union v. NLRB, 4 the court, considering it irrelevant that the discharged
employee was not represented by a recognized union, held that the phrase
"the right to act in concert" protected more than the right to act in concert with
a recognized union.65
The rationale for the expansion of Weingarten was explained by the Board
in Glomac Plastics, Inc.6 6 There it was held that an employee has the right to
representation at an investigatory interview, even in the absence of a
recognized union, because the employer had unlawfully refused to bargain
with a certified union. The Board stated:
51 Detroit Edison Co., 218 N.L.R.B. 61 (1975); Naval Air Rework Facility, 54 Lab. Arb. &
Disp. Settl. 307 (1969).
56 Exxon Co., 223 N.L.R.B. 203 (1976).
5 Detroit Edison Co., 218 N.L.R.B. 61 (1975) (interviewer was a security investigator).
60 Exxon Co., 223 N.L.R.B. 203 (1976).
61 The Arcods Co., 39 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 784 (1962).
o' 420 U.S. at 270 n.1 (Powell and Stewart, JJ., dissenting) (emphasis added).
" NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
64 547 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
65 Id. at 592.
66 234 N.L.R.B. 1309 (1978).
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Our own reading of Weingarten . . .persuades us that the Court's
primary concern was with the right of employees to have some
measure of protection against unjust employer practices, particular-
ly those that threaten job security. These employees' concerns obtain
whether or not the employees are represented by a union. Indeed,
those concerns are more compelling where the employees are
without union representation as a result of employer's misconduct.67
In both cases, there was organizational activity in process, and in Glomac
Plastics, Inc. the union had been certified as the bargaining representative
even though the company refused to extend recognition. 8
Recently, in Newton Sheet Metal,69 the Board held that the question of a
union's statutory representative status is immaterial, since the section 7 right to
representation is enjoyed by all employees and is not dependent upon union
representation for implementation. The Board cited Glomac Plastics, Inc."0 as
authority for the principle that the right to representation extends to all
employees regardless of whether they are represented by a union. This
extension affirmatively establishes that the right is independent of the
existence, or non-existence, of an organizational campaign, a certified but
unrecognized union, a recognized union without a contract, or a full collective
bargaining relationship. This is an appropriate application of Weingarten
since the right to representation should not depend upon the nebulous issue of
a union's statutory representative status. It is difficult to conceive of a rational
reason to support an opposite conclusion. While such an expansion may not
fulfill all the purposes of Weingarten, it may ensure the minimal goals of
establishing a right to representation.
In discussing the role of the representative, the Weingarten Court stated:
"[T]he representative is present to assist the employee, and may attempt to




The assumption was made that the representative would have knowledge of
the collective bargaining agreement and the grievance procedure. 72 If not
represented by a union, an employee would usually request that a co-worker
be permitted to attend the interview with him.73 However, there is no
assurance that a co-worker would have the knowledge of grievance resolution
and discipline that a union representative, such as steward, would reasonably
be expected to possess. Without this expertise, a co-worker could not fulfill the
more active role envisioned by Weingarten.
The presence of a co-worker, however, might satisfy a lesser role. An
employer, at his option, may refuse to permit the representative to participate
in the interview.74 If this occurs, such a representative would be merely a
67 Id. at 1311 (emphasis added).
68 See also Brown & Connolly, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. No. 48,98 L.R.R.M. 1573 (August 4, 1978).
69 238 N.L.R.B. No. 138, 99 L.R.R.M. 1573 (August 4, 1978).
70 234 N.L.R.B. 1309 (1978).
71 420 U.S. at 260.
72 Id. at 262-64 n.7.
73 NLRB v. Columbia Univ., 541 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1976).
74 NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 260 (1975). If an employer believes that such
participation will impede the progress of the interview, he may prefer that the representative not
participate. The amount of participation permitted is dependent upon whether the parties regard
each other as adversaries or partners in the collective bargaining relationship.
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witness to the interview. 7- Since the Weingarten Court, in allowing the
employer this option, appeared to regard the mere presence of a
representative as sufficient protection of an employee's section 7 right, it
would not be inconsistent to conclude that it would be permissible to have a
co-worker present simply as a witness. The section 7 right of representation
thus applies equally to employees not represented by a union. While a co-
worker may not be able to participate in the interview with the expertise of a
union representative, the presence of a co-worker may have therapeutic value
for the employee being interviewed by giving him moral support.
2. Invocation of the Right to Representation by the Employee
The right to representation does not automatically exist merely because an
employee is summoned by the employer to an investigatory interview which
the employee reasonably believes will result in disciplinary action. The
employee must take affirmative action to avail himself of the right by
expressing a request for representation to the employer.
76
One who is not an employee does not have the right to request
representation. 77 There are two good reasons for this. First, since the right to
representation is derived from the N.L.R.A., an individual must be within the
coverage of the Act to avail himself of the rights granted by the statute.
Second, if an individual is not an employee, an investigatory interview poses
no threat to job security.
If an employee fails to request representation in circumstances which
would otherwise entitle the employee to such representation, the employee is
deemed to have waived the right.78 If the employee waives representation,
then under Weingarten the employer may proceed with the interview without
committing an unfair labor practice.7 9 On the other hand, if the employee
timely requests representation, then the employer has two options: the
employer can either halt the interview until a representative is procured, or he
can discontinue the interview and simply impose disciplinary sanctions upon
the employee.80 The sanctions, however, must be based upon the conduct
occasioning the interview and not invoked because the employee has elected
75 Id. at 273 n.5 (Powell and Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
76 Id. at 257.
71 Polson Indus., Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. No. 185, 101 L.R.R.M. 1344 (June 15, 1979). An
"employee" is defined in the United States Code as follows:
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the
employees of a particular employer, unless' this subchapter explicitly states otherwise,
and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in
connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and
who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment ...
29 U.S.C. § 152 (1977).
78 NLRB v. Climax Molybdenum Co., 584 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1978) (employees' failure to
"manifest any interest in consulting with their union representative" results in the loss of the right
to representation).
79 420 U.S. at 257.
80 Id; Chrysler Corp., 241 N.L.R.B. No. 169, 101 L.R.R.M. 1020 (April 20,1979) (holding that
employer did not violate L.M.R.A. by exercising its option of dispensing with the investigatory
interview and simply handing a notice of suspension to the employee who requested
representation); Amoco Oil Co., 238 N.L.R.B. No. 84,99 L.R.R.M. 1250 (Sept. 27 ,1978) (holding
that employer did not violate L.M.R.A. when after employee's repeated insistence on union
representation, employer confined itself to merely informing him of his suspension).
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to exercise his section 7 rights.8' Once the employer discontinues the
investigatory interview and proceeds with the imposition of discipline, the
employee no longer has a right to representation under Weingarten.
The employee can also waive the right to representation if the request for
representation is not timely made. Whether a request is timely depends upon
two factors. First, the timeliness of the employee's request depends upon
whether at that stage of the interview the assistance or presence of a
representative would be beneficial. Clearly a request for representation made
after the investigatory interview is not timely, and the employee will be
deemed to have waived representation.82 After the interview, the presence of
a representative merely to observe the impositon of sanctions would not fulfill
the purpose of Weingarten because the representative would be unable to
assist in the elicitation of facts or compilation of additional information.
The second test for the timeliness of a request for representation which is
made after the outset of the interview is whether the request is made at the
time the employee discovers that discipline may result from the interview.n
An employee's failure to request representation at the outset of the
investigatory interview does not automatically deprive the employee of the
right to request representation at some later point of the interview.84 It cannot
be presumed that an employee will have the requisite reasonable fear of
discipline8 at the instant when the employee is called for the investigatory
interview.
This approach to the timeliness of a request provides flexibility. The
employee need not request representation at the outset of the interview.
While the request may be delayed until the employee reasonably fears
discipline may result, the delay cannot exceed the point beyond which the
representation would be ineffective - usually the end of the interview. The
employee's option of requesting representation is thus protected until the
point at which the employee would not derive any benefits from the hollow
exercise of the Weingarten right.
C. Employers - Responsibilities and Duties
Weingarten firmly enunciated the rule that an employer commits an unfair
labor practice when he refuses to allow employee representation and compels
"1 Spartan Stores, Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. No. 75, 100 L.R.R.M. 1181 (March 30,1978) (holding that
employer committed an unfair labor practice by discharging an employee for asserting his
protected right to refuse to participate without union representation in interview that he
reasonably believed could result in disciplinary action). Accord, Chrysler Corp., 241 N.L.R.B.
No. 169, 101 L.R.R.M. 1020 (April 20,1979) (holding that the discharge of an employee was valid,
since basis for discipline was not the request for representation but the underlying misconduct);
NLRB v. Potter Elec. Signal Co., 600 F.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1979), where the court refused to enforce
the Board's order on the ground that the Board was not warranted in ordering employer, which
violated § 8(a)(1) of L.M.R.A. by requiring two employees who had engaged in fight at
production line to attend investigatory interviews with management personnel without presence
of union steward, to reinstate employees with back pay, where (1) employees were not
discharged for requesting union assistance, especially in view of fact that employees did not insist
upon that right and in fact participated in interviews, and (2) employees were discharged for fight
that resulted in shutting down production line.
12 Greyhound Lines, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. No. 131, 100 L.R.R.M. 1094 (Dec. 15, 1978).
83 Texarkana Memorial Hosp., Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. No. 109,99 L.R.R.M. 1639 (Sept. 29, 1978).
84 Greyhound Lines, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. No. 131, 100 L.R.R.M. 1094 (Dec. 15, 1978).
5420 U.S. at 257.
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the employee, who reasonably believes discipline will result, to attend an
investigatory interview unaccompanied.8 6 An employee, however, may
voluntarily waive his right to representation. 87 The difference between an
employer's blatant intimidation of an employee and an employee's voluntary
waiver is one of degree. If an employee elects to forego his right to
representation, such election must be clear, unmistakable, and free of
duress.88 If an employer could coerce or intimidate an employee into
relinquishing such right, then the right would only exist in theory, clearly
defeating the purpose of Weingarten. It would be an inappropriate result if
the employer tactics which Weingarten was intended to prevent were utilized
to defeat the safeguards created by Weingarten.89
Coercion may be blatant or subtle. The difficulty is not in identifying the
conduct which is obviously coercive; examples are plentiful.90 The more
difficult problem concerns identifying the behavior which is coercive in effect
though not openly coercive. Although the prevention of coercion is a vital
concern, adherence to an overly stringent standard of what constitutes
coercion will severely diminish the ability of the parties to informally resolve a
dispute at the lower levels of industrial hierarchy. 9' To resolve disputes
concerning industrial relations, the use of informal mechanisms is emphasized
to obtain more expeditious settlements. 92 Unfortunately, as due process
procedural requirements are increasingly imposed upon the dispute
adjustment procedure, flexibility and informality are correspondingly
reduced.
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. 93 illustrates the conflict between the
protection of the exercise of the right to representation from intimidation or
coercion and the preservation of informality and flexibility in dispute
resolution. There the Board held coercive an employer's statement, made in
response to employees' inquiries about union involvement in the investiga-
tion, that involving the union in the matter would serve only to draw higher
86 See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
17 See notes 4, 78-82 supra and accompanying text. A waiver of the Weingarten right may
not, however, be implied from the fact that an employee waived his rights under Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Board has held that an employee's Weingarten rights are
unaffected by any Miranda rights he may also have possessed or been accorded, in view of
significant differences in foundation and scope between the two rights. United States Postal
Serv., 241 N.L.R.B. No. 18, 100 L.R.R.M. 1520 (March 19, 1979).
88 See Comment, supra note 13, at 349 n.103.
89 One commentator has observed: "The right being waived is designed to prevent
intimidation by the employer. It would be incongruous to infer a waiver without a clear
indication that the very tactics the right is meant to prevent were not used to coerce a surrender of
protection." Id. at 350.
90 ILGWU v. Quality Mfg. Co., 420 U.S. 276 (1975); Georgia Power Co., 238 N.L.R.B. No. 93,
99 L.R.R.M. 1574 (Sept. 27, 1978) (indirect coercion of employee by threat to union
representative also violative of L.M.R.A. § 8(a) (1) ); Exxon Co., 223 N.L.R.B. 203 (1976) (direct
coercion of employee).
9' Walther, supra note 48, at 194.
92 Comment, The Applicability of State Arbitration Statutes to Proceedings Subject to LMRA
Section 301, 27 OHIo ST. L.J. 692, 693 (1966). The contrast proves particularly significant in a
comparison of an arbitration proceeding and the judicial process. For a discussion of the
desirability of promoting labor arbitration vis-A-vis judicial proceedings, see United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) (the Steelworkers Trilogy).
93 227 N.L.R.B. 1223 (1977).
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level management into the case.9 4 The dissenting Board members deemed
this statement to be nothing more than a realistic, common sense appraisal of
the employees' prospects for receiving fairer treatment from their first line
supervisors, with whom they worked on a day-to-day basis, than from the
more remote, higher levels of management. The dissent did not view the
statement as a threat that union participation would result in the imposition of
more severe discipline.9 5 The dissent's argument focused on the transforma-
tion of a relatively minor dispute, which could have been resolved informally
in a short time by the individuals directly involved, into a formal and
prolonged matter involving higher levels of management.9 6 Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co. represents the movement towards an increasingly formal
and adversary system of labor relations.
The trend toward an adversary labor-management relationship is
undesirable because it represents an importation of criminal procedure
concepts into the labor relations area. Although the labor discipline and
grievance procedure and the adversary criminal law system have often been
analogized,97 the fundamental differences between the two systems require
that an importation of criminal procedure concepts into the labor relations
setting be subject to severe scrutiny. The formalization of labor-management
relations in the manner of the criminal system will promote the adversary
characteristics of the grievance process in derogation of the informality upon
which the process is founded.
An employer is not the state, which possesses awesome powers to control
the physical liberty of individuals. The informal grievance procedure cannot
be fully equated with the complex and intricate judicial system. The
relationship of employer and employee is a functional relationship which
existed prior to the incident generating the interview and, possibly, will
continue after the interview, unlike the relationship of the criminal and the
police. The connection between an alleged criminal and his accusers has only
negative connotations while the relation between employer and employee is
fundamentally positive in that both benefit from the voluntary association. It
is reasonable to fear that the positive aspects of the employer-employee
relationship will be unduly impaired if, in a disciplinary context, the parties
are forced to assume extremely antagonistic roles.98 In such case, the
motivation for the parties to solve the disputes by mutual co-operation would
be substantially reduced in contravention of the policy of Weingarten.
The fears of the dissenters in Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. may be
realized if criminal law precepts continue to be employed in the labor
relations area.99 Adjustment of disputes concerning employee conduct will
94 Id.
95 Id. at 1225 (Penello and Walther, dissenting); see Walther, supra note 48, at 193.
96 227 N.L.R.B. at 1225 (Penello and Walther, dissenting).
91 See Brodie, supra note 10, at 5-9; Kadish, The Criminal Law and Industrial Discipline as
Sanctioning Systems: Some Comparative Observations, Paoc. OF 17TH ANN. MEETNG; OF NAT'L
AcAD. OF ARB. 125 (1964); Silard, supra note 13.
98 However, as the Weingarten Court noted: "[The union representative's] presence need not
transform the interview into an adversary contest." 420 U.S. at 263.
0 One commentator observed:
[In] Climax, Southwestern Bell Telephone, and Certified Grocers, the majority's
interpretation of Weingarten does not encourage parties to expeditiously and informally
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require the care and propriety of a formal court proceeding and will
discourage parties from informally and expeditiously resolving their
problems. An increase in industrial tensions will result if disputes are not
quickly and informally resolved. The incidence of litigation before the courts
and agencies will increase every time another technicality is created. The
greater the number of technical, due process limitations imposed upon the
conduct of an employer towards an employee, the greater the impediments to
the functioning of an informal dispute resolution mechanism.
D. The Union - A Nebulous Role
The role of the union representative in the investigatory interview, as
perceived by the Weingarten Court, is to facilitate communications between
employer and employee, ensuring an expeditious and just disposition of the
problem.100 Neither the nature and scope of the union representative's
function nor the rights and obligations of the union with respect to providing
representation were settled by Weingarten.
1. Invocation by the Union of the Right to Representation
Clearly the individual employee may invoke or waive the right to
representation at an investigatory interview as the employee so chooses.' 10
The issue of whether the union, by implication, is endowed with power to
solve their own problems. Rather, it will increase controversy between labor and
management by requiring that the adjustment of disputes concerning employee
conduct be conducted with "the care and propriety of a formal court proceeding."
Thus, the cause of industrial peace through jointly determined solutions to problems
which is at the heart of the National Labor Relations Act and which was the Supreme
Court's objective in Weingarten will be thwarted.
There is no doubt in my mind that the Board's Climax, Southwestern Bell Telephone
Co., and Certified Grocers decisions will have still another negative effect-they will
increase the incidence of litigation before our agency and the courts. You all know
firsthand the savings in time, energy and money, not to mention the lessening of tensions
in the work environment, when employees and management resolve their problems on
an informal basis. The Climax decision and its progeny will lead to the opposite result-
increased industrial tensions and the consequent filling of a greater number of charges
with the Board because the Board has created another legal technicality upon which
charges can be based. I think you will all agree that the cause of industrial harmony is
best served when problems can be resolved without government intervention.
***The clear and unmistakable objective of the Supreme Court was to enhance
matters related to the lower level grievance procedure and to help solve problems as
they occur by encouraging stewards and supervisors to work them out together.
Walther, supra note 48, at 194 (footnotes omitted).
'00 As Justice Brennan wrote for the Weingarten majority:
The representative is present to assist the employee, and may attempt to clarify the facts
or suggest employees who may have knowledge of them. . . . [Participation by the
union representative] might reasonably be designed to clarify the issues at this first stage
of the existence of a question, to bring out the facts and the policies concerned at this
stage, [and] to give assistance to employees who may lack the ability to express
themselves in their cases. . . . The foreman, himself, may benefit from the presence of
the steward by seeing the issue, the problem, the implications of the facts, and the
collective bargaining clause in question more clearly. . . . The presence of the union
steward is regarded as a factor conducive to the avoidance of formal grievances through
the medium of discussion and persuasion conducted at the threshold of an impending
grievance. It is entirely logical that the steward will employ his office in appropriate
cases so as to limit formal grievances to those which involve differences of substantial
merit.
420 U.S. at 260, 262-63 n.7.
'0' NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 257 (1975).
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invoke the employee's right to representation on behalf of the individual
employee and the bargaining unit as a whole was not decided by Weingarten.
One commentator has suggested there exists a sound basis for a right of the
union to be represented at an investigatory interview, as distinguished from
the right of the employee to request the union's presence.1 0 2 Various benefits
may be derived from permitting union access to such meetings: (1) promotion
of employee interests in future contract negotiations, since the union would be
alerted to problems in disciplinary rules and procedures; 0 3 (2) access to the
meetings, a valuable weapon in the union's later prosecution of employee
grievances;'04 and (3) protection of the interests of the entire bargaining unit in
the fair administration of the disciplinary system. 0
5
A conflict results where the employee may desire to confront the employer
alone while the union wishes to intervene to protect the interests of the
bargaining unit. The resolution of this conflict can be achieved by an
understanding of the disciplinary system. The disciplinary process may be
separated into four stages: .investigation and investigatory interview,
disciplinary hearing, grievance procedure, and arbitration. The union has the
right to be present at the latter three stages; 10 however, there is no mandatory
duty upon the employer to permit the union to be present at an investigatory
interview. 10 7 Since the union is entitled to be present at all proceedings
subsequent to the investigatory interview, there is no compelling reason to
insist that the union also be permitted to attend the investigatory interview in
its own right; the interests of the bargaining unit may be adequately protected
at the later stages.
The Tenth Circuit adopted this view in Climax Molybdenum Co. v.
NLRB,10 8 holding that the employer did not commit an unfair labor practice
when it refused to permit a union representative to consult with the
employees prior to the interview, since the employees had not requested
union representation at the interview and there was no indication that they
were interested in such representation. 0 9 It is apparent from the court's
holding that a union cannot claim a right to be present at an investigatory
interview if the employee does not request such representation since the right
is vested in the employee, not the union. This applies to both the situation
where the employee remains silent as to his preferences and, particularly, the
instance where the employee refuses representation.
2. Waiver by the Union of the Right to Representation
Although the union lacks the power to invoke the right to representation, a
102 Comment, supra note 13, at 340.
103 Id. at 341.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 338.
1o" 29 U.S.C. § 159 (a). See also NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 259-60 (1975)
(disciplinary interview); Wirtz, Due Process of Arbitration, PHOC. OF 11TH ANN. MEErNC OF NAT'L
ACAD. OF AR. 1, 25 (1958) (arbitration hearings); Comment, supra note 13, at 348 (prosecution of
grievance).
107 NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 260 (1975).
108 584 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1978). See also Climax Molybdenum Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 1189,1192
(1977) (Penello and Walther, dissenting).
109 584 F.2d at 363.
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closely related question involves the ability .of the union to waive the
individual employee's right to representation by the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement or by refusal to represent the employee at the
investigatory interview.
The first type of waiver, negation of the right to representation through the
collective bargaining process, is dependent upon the scope of the union's
authority to relinquish a statutory right of an employee. It has been long
established that a union may bargain away the statutory right to strike in order
to promote the national policy of the peaceful settlement of labor disputes110
Unlike the right to strike, sacrifice of the employees' right to representation
serves no public interest."' 1 The right to representation provides the employee
with the assurance of procedural due process. If an employee is deprived of
this right, no benefit accrues to the public interest. A comparison of the right to
representation and economic benefits is equally inapplicable. The argument
against such a comparison may be stated as follows:
(W]here economic benefits are traded away in the bargaining
process, employees who would have preferred what was sacrificed
over what was received suffer only a bad bargain. In contrast, if this
procedural right is bargained away, employees who would have
preferred to keep it will suffer an increased risk of unfair
discipline.112
The union should not be permitted to waive an employee's right to
representation during the collective bargaining process since the loss of the
right by the individual employee benefits only the union. The decision to
waive the right should remain the option of the individual employee. The
employer will not derive a greater benefit from a contractual waiver since the
employer can eliminate the presence of a union representative by dispensing
with the investigatory interview.
Although this issue has not been directly confronted by the Board or the
courts, New York Telephone Co."3 implies that the right to representation is
waivable during collective bargaining negotiations. The issue of whether an
employee is entitled to union representation at the investigating interview was
considered dependent upon whether the union, during bargaining
negotiations, had waived the employee's right to representation. The
implication to be drawn from this case is that if the right to representation was
bargained away by the union, then the employee is effectively deprived of the
right. Such a rule is unfortunate because the only party whose interest is
substantially impaired by such a waiver is the individual employee.
The second type of waiver, refusal to represent the employee at the
investigatory interview, poses a problem as to the union's duty to provide fair
representation. When a dispute has entered the grievance procedure, the
union is permitted to refuse to process the grievance if, after a good faith
investigation of the merits, the union concludes that the claim is insubstantial
"0 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
"' Comment, supra note 13, at 349.
112 Id.
"3 219 N.L.R.B. 679 (1975).
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or nonmeritorious."' However, a distinction must be drawn between the
refusal to pursue a grievance and the refusal to represent the employee at an
investigatory interview. To fulfill the duty of fair representation, the union
may only refuse to pursue a grievance after investigation. At the time of the
investigatory interview, however, the union will not have had the opportunity
to scrutinize the merits of the employee's position. Consequently, the union
should be under a duty to provide an employee with representation at an
investigatory interview when the employee so requests."' 5 The only benefit to
be derived from allowing the union to refuse representation at this stage is a
benefit to the union because it would be relieved of responsibility. The union
would have the power to negate the employee's right to representation. A
failure by the union to provide such representation, when the employee so
requests, should constitute a breach of the duty of fair representation.,,
3. The Appropriate Representative: Identity and Scope of Duty
The Weingarten Court, envisioning an aura of cooperation between the
employee and the union representative, phrased the role description of the
representative in general terms, although frequent reference was made to the
"union steward" in the discussion of the function of the representative." 7 The
precise identity of the representative, his duties, and scope of authority were
not conclusively delineated in the Weingarten decision, although the Court
did speak of a "knowledgeable union representative."" 8 The Board has
subsequently issued some decisions pertaining to the definition of the
appropriate representative which deserve examination.
In Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,"9 the union steward was unavailable and,
although the union business agent could have been summoned, the employee
did not request the alternative representation. The Board held that the
employer did not commit an unfair labor practice by conducting the
investigatory interview without union representation. 12 0 The qualifications of
the business agent to serve as the representative were not discussed by the
Board. This omission might imply that one union representative will suffice as
well as another, provided either of the possible representatives is familiar with
the grievance procedure.
This definition was expanded upon by the Board in Climax Molybdenum
Co.,12' where the phrase "knowledgeable union representative" was
construed to mean a representative who has had time before the interview to
114 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190-92 (1967).
11 Cf. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 67 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 237 (1976) (holding that union may
permit the interview to proceed even though representative was unavailable).
I" See Lewis v. Greyhound Lines-East, 555 F.2d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1977): "[The union] breached
its duty of fair representation to [the employee] by not informing [the employees] of the
substantive change [in the contract] which denied them union representation [at an investigatory
interview]." 555 F.2d at 1057-58 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
"7 E.g., 420 U.S. at 261 n.6, 262-63 n.7.
11l Id. at 263.
119 227 N.L.R.B. 1276 (1977).
120 It should be noted that in the Coca-Cola Bottling case, the employee insisted on the
presence of the steward with full knowledge that the steward was on vacation. The unavailability
of the steward was not due to the actions of the employer. Id. at 1278-79.
121 227 N.L.R.B. 1189 (1977), enforcement denied, 584 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1978).
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fully acquaint himself with the employee's version of events. The Tenth
Circuit did not directly discuss the Board's definition of a "knowledgeable
representative" but noted that the union was not entitled to a consultation with
the employees prior to the interview for the purpose of becoming acquainted
with the events occasioning the interview.22 This holding would nullify the
Board's definition of a knowledgeable representative, leaving as the only
viable definition the one established by Coca-Cola Bottling Co. 12 3 The
approach of Coca-Cola Bottling Co. is more in accord with Weingarten
because it restricts the concept of the appropriate representative to one who is
generally knowledgeable about grievance resolution, rather than one who is
versed in the particular facts of a particular grievance. 12 4
It appears that the Board has returned to the definition of the appropriate
representative established by Coca-Cola Bottling Co. and the opinion of the
Tenth Circuit in Climax Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB. In recent decisions by
the Board, "union officers and committeemen '"1 15 and "known union
leaders' '126 have been deemed to be appropriate representatives without
discussion of the meaning of "knowledgeable." This omission can reasonably
be interpreted to indicate that a "knowledgeable representative" need only be
relatively familiar with the grievance process and contract.
The role of the union representative, as established by Weingarten, has
been adhered to by the lower courts. The Weingarten Court firmly stated that
the union representative's "presence need not transform the interview into an
adversary contest.' ' 27 In Climax Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB128 the court was
confronted with a situation where the avowed policy of the union was non-
cooperation with the employer in an investigatory interview, thus transfor-
ming the interview into an adversary process. The court severely sanctioned
this form of union behavior. 2 9
122 Climax Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB, 584 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1978); see also Climax
Molybdenum Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 1189, 1192 (1977) (Penello and Walther, dissenting).
1- 227 N.L.R.B. 1189 (1977).
124 This was the approach taken in Weingarten. 420 U.S. at 262 n.7. See Walther, supra note 48,
at 191.
125 Texarkana Memorial Hosp., Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. No. 109,99 L.R.R.M. 1638 (Sept. 29,1978).
126 Crown Zellerbach, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. No. 138, 100 L.R.R.M. 1092 (Dec. 29, 1978).
[A] known union leader of the union movement at Respondent's plant, was suggested to
[the employee] by [Respondent] .... [The employee] was asked about and received,
the presence of a fellow union member who was an influential union force within the
plant. The fact [that the union leader] did not bear the label "union representative" does
not detract from the obvious conclusions to be drawn from his presence. A logical
question is, what would a "union representative" have done for [the employee that the
union leader] did not do? The answer, so far as the record shows, is nothing. Proper
application of the rule in this case requires finding that Respondent did what is expected
of it under Weingarten. The contention that [the employee] was deprived of his
Weingarten rights because [the union leader] was only a "witness" is of no effect. (a)
[The union leader] was readily accepted by [the employee]. (b) [The union leader]
acted as more than a witness. (c) [The union leader] was a more competent
representative.
Id. at 1092-93.
127 420 U.S. at 263.
128 548 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1978).
129 The court stated:
Union officials had urged Union members (employees) not to cooperate with
management in any investigatory interviews. [A union officer] candidly acknowledged
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The disapproval voiced by the court in Climax Molybdenum Co. was
appropriate and justifiable. It is unacceptable to permit the union represen-
tative to transform the interview into a formalized, adversary hearing in
contravention of the express holding of Weingarten. In reference to the role of
a representative it has been stated that "[t]he steward [should] not act like
counsel in a criminal case, instructing the employee what to do or say or
warning him of possible self-incrimination."' 3 0 Countenancing such behavior
would unduly infringe upon the employer's prerogatives, since the employer
has a significant interest in the investigation of plant conditions and job
performance. 131 The purpose of Weingarten was not to impair the ability of
the employer to conduct an investigation but to protect the employee's
interest in a fair hearing and to expedite the investigatory process. A policy of
non-cooperation by the union, as exhibited in Climax Molybdenum Co.,
should be prevented through the imposition of unfair labor practice sanctions.
IV. CONCLUSION
The right to representation established by Weingarten represents a growth
of due process concepts in the field of labor relations. As Weingarten has been
expanded, many problems have arisen in the shaping of the parameters of this
right.
The definition of what constitutes an investigatory interview is unclear. In
the further development of such definition, care must be taken to distinguish
between disciplinary and investigatory interviews. The two interviews
occupy different positions in the disciplinary structure and do not serve the
same purpose. The objective standards for determining whether an
employee's belief that discipline will result from the interview is reasonable
must be established so as to provide notice to an employer of when the
presence of a union representative is mandated by Weingarten.
The expansion of the right to representation to non-unionized employees
fulfills the purpose of Weingarten in a limited fashion. A co-worker's presence
at an investigatory interview provides the employee with a sympathetic
witness.
The area in which the expansion of Weingarten has been most detrimental
to the labor-management relationship is the employer's responsibility with
respect to the employee's right to representation. The standard for
determining if the employer coerced the employee into relinquishing his
that such was the Union's policy. . . .This approach is directly contrary to the very
purpose of an investigative interview, i.e., to ascertain what the problem is, how it has
developed and what, if any, solution or direction is dictated based upon the facts
disclosed. The final outcome of some investigatory interviews very likely will lead to the
dismissal of the employee. That, however, does not alter the fact that such interviews are
investigatory in nature before the employer has committed himself to any disciplinary
action against an employee. The Union's policy of non-cooperation exacerbates
problems rather than resolving them. An investigatory interview is fact-finding in
character, constituting an effort on the part of the employer to maintain discipline and
plant security. The outcome or consequence cannot be determined until the nature of
the employee's conduct is ascertained.
Id. at 363-64.
130 Comment, supra note 13, at 344.
131 Id. See Climax Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB, 584 F.2d 360, 363 (10th Cir. 1978).
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section 7 right, as established by Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.,t32 is overly
broad since it tends to discourage efforts by the parties to expeditiously and
informally resolve their dispute. Such a tendency is undesirable because it
contradicts the basic policy of labor relations. The recently created
requirement that the employer provide the employee with a Weingarten
warning unreasonably accelerates the transformation of an investigatory
interview into an adversary hearing. Weingarten envisioned an enhancement
of mutual co-operation, not an atmosphere of combativeness. A rule that
emphasizes the adversary aspects of the employment relationship only
impairs the functioning of that relationship.
The development of the rights and responsibilities of the union in regard to
the right to representation is, thus far, well suited to the furtherance of the
Weingarten policies. Refusing the union the right to invoke representation
does not impair the ability of the union to adequately protect the collective
interests of the bargaining unit. An investigatory interview is only the initial
step in the disciplinary process. The union has sufficient opportunity at the
subsequent stages, including the disciplinary hearing, the grievance
procedure, and arbitration, to advance the interests of the entire bargaining
unit. The union should not be permitted to waive the employee's right to
representation in either the collective bargaining agreement or by a refusal to
provide representation when it is so requested. A general waiver as part of the
collective bargaining agreement only serves the interests of the union and the
employer. The consequences of such a waiver are borne by the individual
employee. If a union, on its own initiative, is permitted to refuse
representation, the opportunity for the union to negate the employee's right to
representation arises, and the possibility of discrimination is present. Such a
refusal by the union should be a breach of the duty of fair representation. The
definition of the appropriate union representative as one who is generally
knowledgeable about grievance resolution is in full accord with Weingarten.
The representative need not be fully versed in the employee's version of
events to effectuate a fair and expeditious resolution of the matter.
The subsequent development of the Weingarten right poses a threat to the
fundamental nature of the labor-management relationship. An excessively
stringent and broad application of Weingarten will promote the potentially
adversary nature of the disciplinary system to an unreasonable degree, thus
reducing the flexibility and informality characterizing disciplinary
procedures. There must be careful consideration of the nature of the
employer-employee relationship and the fundamental policy favoring
informal dispute resolution to avoid an adverse impact upon the labor
relations system. Weingarten was intended to enhance the employer-
employee relationship, not to undermine it. Future decisions interpreting
Weingarten must incorporate reality into the abstract principles.
KATHY A. WIREMAN
132 227 N.L.R.B. 1223 (1977).
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